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ABSTRACT 
A long standing goal of science education in the United States has been that students develop an understanding of 
the nature of science, of what scientific knowledge is like and how it is constructed. Despite this interest, students 
continue to leave secondary schools with naïve views of the nature of science. Current science education reforms 
advocate inquiry as a way for students to learn about the nature of science as well as scientific concepts. Inquiry 
engages students in their own efforts to construct scientific knowledge, and several efforts to use technology to 
support inquiry have been effective at helping students understand important scientific concepts and develop 
certain skills of scientific reasoning. Still, there is no evidence that doing inquiry in school develops students’ 
understanding of the nature of science. The reason for this is twofold. First, assessments of students’ ideas of the 
nature of science universally target professional science, rather than students’ own efforts to do science. Students’ 
views on the nature of their own inquiry may be “scientific,” but not be related to their views of professional 
science. Second, helping students to draw such relationships may depend upon an explicitly epistemic discourse in 
the classroom, centered on what students know and how they know it, and that connects their work to professional 
science. Technology can support such a discourse by helping students to generate artifacts from their inquiry 
structured to highlight epistemic issues. These epistemic tools should represent important epistemic forms of 
scientific knowledge that link to practices for making them. Most importantly, research on epistemological 
development must link students’ practices of inquiry to their expressed beliefs about professional science. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For the last half century, several waves of inquiry-based reform have washed over science education in 
the United States. A recurring goal of these reforms is to develop students' ideas about the nature of 
science, their scientific epistemologies. This interest in developing students' ideas about science, about 
what scientific knowledge is, how it is generated and ratified, and how science generally gets done, 
stems from two concerns. One is the notion that scientific understanding extends beyond knowing a 
collection of concepts to include a view of science as a way of knowing. A second concern is that in 
order to participate effectively in a democracy, citizens must understand the nature of scientific claims 
that increasingly influence or even become matters of public debate. Science education is currently in 
the midst of a reform wave in which inquiry is urged as a "central strategy" of instruction (NRC, 1996, 
pg. 31), as a better way of learning science and about science. Yet, engaging students in scientific 
inquiry raises a paradox:  doing inquiry may be the best way to develop students' ideas about science, 
but students' ideas about science often interfere with their inquiry. It seems that students who do not 
already hold constructivist epistemological beliefs do not learn as much from inquiry (Linn & Songer, 
1993), and even resist it (Tobin, Tippins, & Hook, 1995).While inquiry remains the centerpiece of 
efforts to reform science education, too little work has been done to understand whether and how doing 
inquiry in science classrooms changes students' underlying ideas about the nature of science.  
 
 826
The inquiry paradox has two aspects that science education has yet to untangle. On the one hand, 
evidence suggests that students’ beliefs about science are at odds with the epistemological assumptions 
of scientific inquiry. On the other hand, students’ practices of inquiry often seem to have much in 
common with professional scientific practice. There is a gap between these two areas of research that 
centers around two issues. The first issue is that little is known about how students’ beliefs about 
science influence their own efforts to conduct inquiry in school. The second issue is that assessments of 
students’ beliefs about professional science may not elicit their personal beliefs about knowledge 
creation, and so potentially fail to capture any epistemological change through inquiry. This paper 
describes this research gap by summarizing current evidence on students’ epistemological beliefs about 
science, and comparing these to findings about inquiry practices. This comparison suggests that inquiry 
could provide the basis for epistemological development, but not without an explicit epistemological 
discourse that connects students’ work to science in society. At the same time, research on 
epistemological development needs to explicitly investigate the links between epistemological beliefs 
and inquiry practices, joining two areas of research that have so far been separate. This analysis 
suggests that epistemic tools, software that help students articulate scientific knowledge, can support 
meaningful epistemological discourse, and research on students’ epistemological understanding. 
 
STUDENTS’ BELIEFS ABOUT SCIENCE 
 
A sophisticated Western epistemology of science                                                                            
Before looking at students’ epistemologies of science, it will be helpful to consider what the target is. 
What sort of epistemology of science should students develop? Key to the present argument is the 
connection of scientific epistemology to scientific practice. Speaking broadly, and mindful of 
arguments against any overt scientific method, scientists engage in a set of practices intended to 
produce certain kinds of knowledge. This is especially important with regard to how most people 
encounter professional science in their everyday lives – as consumers who need to make judgments 
about various scientific claims in relation to decisions they make about their own lives. These include 
personal decisions, such as what foods to eat, as well as public decisions, such as whether or not drill in 
the Arctic Wildlife Refuge or allow stem cell research, to name two current controversies. Such 
decisions include many non-scientific factors, but thoughtful judgments demand an understanding of 
the role that science plays in them. 
 
There is no single, consensus scientific epistemology that scientists, philosophers, and historians agree 
on. There are, however, several aspects regarding the nature of scientific knowledge and scientific work 
for which there is general agreement and that students arguably should understand. There is general 
agreement that scientific knowledge, such as theories and laws, are constructed by people to describe 
and explain the world, rather than being facts discovered in the world. As such, scientific knowledge is 
tentative, and the development of scientific knowledge demands creativity and imagination. At the 
same time, scientific claims must be “evaluated against the recalcitrance of the material world”(Driver, 
Newton, & Osborne, 2000). Science is therefore empirical, ideas are often generated by observations of 
the world and systematically revised through empirical tests. There is broad agreement, however, that 
empirical work is not purely objective. Instead theory guides both the design of empirical investigation 
and the interpretation of results. Since science is a human construction, scientific practice is embedded 
within historical social and cultural values. Indeed, science is socially constructed to the extent that 
new, revolutionary claims are not accepted until members of the scientific community have been 
persuaded of their value. Much of scientific practice can therefore be seen as the development of 
practices of inscription and argumentation. Science education therefore must be concerned with the 
relation between students’ beliefs about scientific knowledge and their understanding of the practices 
used to generate and evaluate such knowledge. Fundamental to learning science should be the 
development of competence in making and reading inscriptions, criteria for their evaluation, and 
abilities to use inscriptions to communicate scientific ideas. For a summary of the philosophical and 
sociological work from which these ideas derive, see (Lederman, Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, & Schwartz, 
2002). 
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Students’ beliefs about professional science 
Research on students’ beliefs about the nature of science has gone on for several decades, and has been 
too thoroughly reviewed to do so here (see Abd-El-Khalick & Lederman, 2000; Driver, Leach, Millar, 
& Scott, 1996). Despite important differences, there are broadly consistent findings from this long-
running work. Most students seem to believe that science is an accumulation of facts about the world, 
rather than explanations about the world created by people. They seem to think that the ideas that 
scientists generate and test are descriptions of the actual world. They tend to see experimentation as a 
process of straightforwardly proving ideas right or wrong, or even that experiments yield answers to 
questions directly. Most students have a hierarchical view of the relations between hypotheses, theories, 
and laws based upon their degree of certainty rather than their scope and purpose. That is, most students 
see hypotheses as guesses, theories as well-tested hypotheses, and laws as irrefutably proven theories. 
Students rarely see science or scientists as creative, except in a narrow sense of needing to be clever to 
devise experiments. They do not recognize that scientists use their imaginations to generate theoretical 
constructs, such as Bohr’s analogy of the solar system to describe the structure of atoms, or Darwin’s 
and Wallace’s independent formulation of the process of natural selection as an explanation for species 
variation. Students tend to view historical ideas as uniformly wrong and current ideas as right, rather 
than viewing scientific knowledge developmentally. 
 
Still, there has long been concern that the methods used to assess students’ views of the nature of 
science are problematic. A historical reliance on survey instruments has forced subjects to express their 
ideas solely in terms of the researchers’ framework (Lederman, Wade, & Bell, 1998). Such forced 
choices may not enable students to adequately express their own beliefs. Open-ended questionnaires or 
interviews elicit students’ ideas, but are not without methodological concerns. One problem is that 
interpreting students’ responses to questions like “What’s a theory?” or “What is an experiment?” can 
be rather difficult, and the probing that such questions require potentially leads students towards 
particular responses. Another issue is that such instruments often assume that students have stable, 
coherent epistemological frameworks (even while characterizing the nature of science as 
multidimensional). Several recent studies suggest that this unitary assumption is unwarranted – that 
students’ epistemological beliefs seem fragmented and sometimes contradictory depending upon the 
context (Hammer, 1994; Roth & Roychoudhury, 1994; Sandoval & Morrison, 2003). 
 
Students’ beliefs about science learning 
One of the issues that plagues research on epistemological development generally is the conflation of 
beliefs about knowledge with beliefs about learning (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Clearly, they are related, 
but queries about students’ strategies for learning do not necessarily allow inferences about their beliefs 
about knowledge. Instead, such views on learning may simply reflect students’ beliefs about the best or 
easiest way to get through school, or reflect other social motives. There appears to be some relation 
between students’ views of scientific knowledge and their ideas about how to best learn science. 
Students who see science as a dynamic construction of knowledge tend to have more constructivist 
orientations to learning. Students who have an objectivist view of knowledge, tend to favor rote 
learning strategies. Still, it turns out that most students resist clean classification as having either 
constructivist or objectivist beliefs, either about knowledge or learning (see Linn & Songer, 1993; Roth 
& Roychoudhury, 1994). 
 
So, after more than four decades, we are certain only that students’ beliefs about the nature of science 
are not as sophisticated as we would hope. It seems as though they hold specific beliefs about the 
absolute nature of scientific knowledge and the ability of experiments to provide definitive answers, but 
we remain unsure of whether or not students really hold such views or if these positions are artifacts of 
our own assessments. We know little of how students’ epistemological beliefs develop, and how 
science education contributes to this. Crucially for inquiry-based reforms, we know very little about 
how students’ beliefs about science influence their own inquiry. 
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STUDENTS’ PRACTICES OF INQUIRY 
Most students have a difficult time conducting their own inquiry without some kind of guidance. Most 
of the research into students’ efforts to conduct inquiry has focused on their strategies of 
experimentation and their attempts to coordinate claims with evidence, and more recently researchers 
have begun to examine practices of argumentation. In contrast to studies of expressed epistemological 
beliefs, students’ inquiry practices appear to have much in common with scientific practice. 
 
Investigation strategies 
Cognitive scientists have been studying experimentation and hypothesis-testing strategies for several 
decades and have documented a variety of difficulties for students and non-scientists (Zimmerman, 
2000). When viewed against normative standards for experimentation, students do not seem to be very 
scientific. They are often unsystematic in their experimentation, failing to control variables across tests 
and often ignoring patterns of results and attending only to the most recent one. Many of these studies, 
especially early ones, can be criticized on the grounds that the tasks involved are only tangentially 
related to science, and that subjects may not approach them with the same goals researchers have 
defined. This issue of goals is particularly important in trying to infer whether or not people are acting 
“scientifically.” Studies that have manipulated the goal orientation that subjects are likely to take have 
found that when subjects see the purpose of experimentation as generating causal explanations, they 
design better experiments and are more systematic. When students have more causal knowledge about a 
domain, they experiment within that domain more effectively. All of these findings suggest that 
differences between students’ and scientists’ experimentation strategies are partially related to 
epistemology, in terms of the goals that experimenters pursue, but may stem mostly from differences in 
knowledge about the domain of investigation. 
 
Coordinating claims with evidence 
Children and adult non-scientists often fail to attend to important patterns in data, and are biased to 
ignore or distort data that threaten strongly held ideas. For educators, this is obviously a problem 
because it can interfere with students’ learning scientifically accepted ideas that challenge intuitive 
conceptions. Is the failure to accurately coordinate theory with evidence necessarily unscientific, as it 
has been characterized? Students’ approaches to anomalous data seem to have much in common with 
professional scientific practice, as the historical record suggests scientists are highly unlikely to 
abandon theories in the face of conflicting data except as a last resort (Chinn & Brewer, 1993).  
 
Examinations of the ways in which students try to make sense of data reveal several strategies that can 
be considered scientific and useful. Students prefer plausible causal mechanisms over implausible 
correlations to explain events (Koslowski, 1996). They also generate causal mechanisms to explain 
incomplete or missing data (Brem & Rips, 2000). This disposition toward causal mechanism aligns well 
with the theory-laden nature of science. Related to this, students appear sensitive to the criterion for 
causal coherence in scientific explanations, although their ability to meet that criterion depends upon 
their conceptual understanding of specific problems (Sandoval, 2003). Students’ difficulties in 
coordinating claims with evidence may have mostly to do with knowledge about specific domains, 
about possible causes and the evidence that bears on them, rather than epistemological naïveté. 
 
Practices of argumentation 
Modern epistemological perspectives on science view argumentation as a central scientific practice, and 
some have argued that argumentation should be central to science instruction (Driver et al., 2000). 
Argumentation has recently become an object of study, through both conversation and written artifacts. 
Most of these analyses have focused on the structure of students’ arguments. Students practices of 
argumentation are not, on the whole, structurally different from scientists. That is, students make claims 
about data, provide warrants for claims, and so forth. In conversation, students will challenge 
unwarranted claims, at least some of the time. Students mainly seem to differ from scientists, not 
surprisingly, in the choices they make about when claims need to be warranted. Many claims that 
require warrant, from a normative perspective, are often unwarranted and go unchallenged. In written 
artifacts, students often fail to explicitly cite the data that warrant claims, even when they have used that 
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data to generate their claims (Sandoval, 2003). Such aspects of students’ argumentative practices are 
partially explained by their depth of knowledge in particular domains. It takes domain knowledge to 
recognize claims as unwarranted, for example. At the same time, students’ epistemic criteria for what 
makes a good argument or a good explanation lack the precision common to professional scientific 
argumentation. Again, this should not be surprising. Analyses of students’ argumentation provides one 
way to understand students’ epistemic criteria in relation to desired instructional outcomes. 
 
DEVELOPING EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS THROUGH INQUIRY 
 
While students’ arguments and interpretations of data can be read as scientific in the ways just 
discussed, it is possible that their strategies are driven by goals to get absolutely right answers and to 
weed out wrong answers. That is, the same broad set of strategies could possibly serve different 
epistemological goals. Besides, it is unclear from studies of students’ practice whether they are pursuing 
scientific goals or school goals, and the latter is much more likely. What is known is that engaging 
students in the practice of inquiry is insufficient to change their epistemological beliefs about science 
(Lederman et al., 1998). 
 
Explicit epistemological discourse 
Simply engaging in inquiry activities in which epistemological issues are implicitly embedded does not 
appear to change students’ views of professional science (Meichtry, 1992; Sandoval & Morrison, 2003). 
Changing epistemological ideas seems to require a sustained discourse on epistemological issues. Even 
so, epistemological change seems to take time. Smith et al. (2000) report that the teacher in their study 
did not explicitly label epistemological identities such as ‘hypothesis’, but created a setting in which 
students were constantly challenged to justify their ideas with evidence, consider alternative views, and 
so on. The discourse in this classroom explicitly centered on how students knew what they knew. These 
students had significantly more sophisticated epistemological perspectives on science than a 
comparison group. This study is remarkably singular, however, as the students in the treatment group 
had the same teacher for six years. Rosebery and colleagues (1992) documented shifts in the language 
that their students used to talk about claims and evidence over the course of a year in which discourse 
norms were a central focus of instruction. Yet, they did not assess students’ epistemological beliefs 
more formally, so it remains unclear whether or not students’ changes in arguing about their own ideas 
changed their views about science. Developing norms of argumentation consistent with scientific 
practice should contribute to epistemological development, more than didactic instruction is likely to. 
Still, more needs to be known about how to structure and sustain such a discourse, and how to assess its 
effects on students’ beliefs about professional science. 
 
Epistemic tools to structure artifacts and discourse 
Inquiry focused on the construction of artifacts can support, in principle, an epistemological discourse 
because it can focus talk on the nature of the artifacts themselves and their relation to the processes by 
which they are made. Such artifacts need to represent valued forms of scientific knowledge, such as 
models or theory-based arguments for specific cases. There are a variety of recent software tools 
designed to support students’ construction of such artifacts (Bell & Linn, 2000; Jackson, Stratford, 
Krajcik, & Soloway, 1994; Sandoval, 2003; Toth, Suthers, & Lesgold, 2002). These are epistemic tools 
that structure the form of the artifacts that students might construct in ways that make salient  the 
epistemic features of those forms. As such, they can provide guidance to students about the purpose of 
their inquiry – to construct a good artifact – and the strategies that may help them meet their goals. 
Epistemic tools support an explicit discourse about knowledge construction as they are used, and this 
seems to help students in solving specific problems. The artifacts from such tools can support a broader 
epistemological discourse, however, as they are taken up in conversation in the classroom. Public 
comparison of epistemic artifacts should go beyond comparing their quality, but extend to public 
discussions about the nature of the artifact itself. For example, in comparing models, it is important for 
teachers and students to explicitly consider  what  models are (and are not), what they are for, and how 
they might be developed. That is, considerations of quality have to be grounded explicitly in terms of 
the epistemological purpose of the artifact. This is an important way in which students’ work in school 
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can be compared explicitly to scientific work, through a linkage of goals. Students can model and 
explain for the same reasons that scientists do, while the strategies they use to do so and the knowledge 
they draw upon may be different. 
 
There has been a tremendous amount of effort to develop inquiry-based science curricula and to 
understand how these help students learn science. Such efforts usually ignore epistemological issues or 
take them for granted. When epistemology is an explicit concern, such efforts can illuminate much 
about students’ understanding of inquiry through analyses of how they pursue it and the nature of the 
artifacts that they produce. Indeed, engaging students in the construction of disciplinary artifacts is an 
important way of understanding their epistemological ideas. In building artifacts, students have to make 
decisions about when they have arrived at a satisfactory solution, what counts as good, and so on.  
It is important to see that while a sustained public epistemological discourse in the classroom can 
exploit epistemic tools and the artifacts they help students create, the challenge of creating and 
sustaining this discourse is not technological. The key changes in roles are social. For teachers, the 
change in roles extends beyond the familiar exhortation to act as a coach. To support a sustained 
epistemological discourse demands that teachers give up their own position of absolute authority and 
instead adopt a more democratic position in developing norms and standards in the classroom. These 
norms include the criteria for what counts as valued knowledge and the means for making it as well as 
standards of discourse, i.e., how people should talk to each other. Of course, students’ roles must also 
shift from recipients of information to constructors and evaluators of knowledge claims. Yet, in this 
social shift teachers have the crucial role. A full discussion of this role is beyond the present scope, but 
it is worth pointing out that the demands of organizing and facilitating such a discourse is not 
something that science teachers are currently prepared for. Consequently, it is not enough to develop 
good tools and give them to teachers. Science teachers themselves need opportunities to understand 
science. Here, as with students, the evidence on efforts to change teachers’ ideas about the nature of 
science is somewhat discouraging, and points to the need for an explicit epistemological focus to 
science teacher education (Abd-El-Khalick & Lederman, 2000). 
 
RESEARCH LINKING PRACTICES TO BELIEFS 
 
To provide a more solid foundation for instructional practice and to assess the effects of instruction on 
epistemological beliefs, research on beliefs must be linked to research on practice. On one hand, 
students’ expressed beliefs about professional science seem naïve and unscientific. On the other hand, 
aspects of their own efforts to engage in science seem scientific. The difficulty in squaring these 
contradictory images is that the research on scientific epistemology has largely taken place separately 
from research on scientific practice and efforts to support students’ inquiry. For inquiry reforms to 
prosper, these areas of research need to be integrated in ways that can contribute to a grounded theory 
of epistemological development and instructional approaches that draw on such a theory. 
 
A practice-based theory of epistemological development 
Available assessments of epistemological beliefs assume multiple dimensions of epistemological 
beliefs, but seem to also assume that such beliefs comprise stable, coherent frameworks. An alternative 
account that may explain reported inconsistencies in students’ epistemological views is that 
epistemological conceptions are fragmented “resources” that students bring to bear differently in 
different contexts (Hammer & Elby, 2002). This view can potentially explain the differences between 
students’ reported beliefs about professional science and their own work to construct scientific 
knowledge. The resources view has grown out of diSessa’s “knowledge in pieces” theory of conceptual 
change (diSessa, 1993). Hammer and Elby propose that through their efforts to learn about the world, 
including formal schooling experiences but not limited to those, people develop a loose collection of 
epistemological ideas that guide subsequent efforts to build knowledge. They propose some candidate 
resources regarding the form or source of knowledge, such as “knowledge is stuff.” According to 
Hammer and Elby, such a resource has implications for learning, including that knowledge can be 
acquired and transferred. Teachers have knowledge, for example, that they can give to students. This 
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resource also includes the notion that giving someone your knowledge “stuff” does not take it away 
from you.  
 
Other epistemological ideas can be inferred from much of the literature discussed above. People 
generally seem to believe that causal mechanisms must be plausible and also that plausible causal 
mechanisms have more weight than implausible correlations of data. People generally seem to believe 
that claims need evidence, or at least are more believable when they have evidence. Ideas like “claims 
must be plausible” and “evidence strengthens claims” are productive resources for inquiry. A less 
productive idea for inquiry is that “evidence is objective” as opposed to, say, “evidence is interpreted.” 
That students hold an “evidence is objective” resource can be inferred from responses to interviews and 
questionnaires (Driver et al., 1996; Lederman, 1992) and also potentially explains certain patterns of 
students’ use of evidence in written arguments. Often data are simply presented without explication, as 
if their meaning were self-evident (Sandoval, 2001). 
 
This resources theory or some grounded account is most likely to explain the apparent instability and 
internal contradictions of students’ views of science, as well as recent findings suggesting that 
epistemological ideas develop differently across domains (Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000). This 
perspective raises several questions. What epistemological resources do people actually use? How do 
they differ across domains such as science and history? How does school contribute to their 
development? How do resources interact during specific episodes of reasoning, in school or out? 
Pursuing answers to these questions requires at least three concurrent strands of research that must be 
actively interconnected. 
 
Practices of knowledge creation and evaluation 
Research efforts to support inquiry commonly treat students’ strategies of investigation as objects of 
study, but the epistemological aspects of strategy use are rarely treated explicitly. As suggested above, 
the analysis of the artifacts that students construct from their inquiry is a key opportunity for exploring 
students’ investigation strategies relative to epistemic goals. The strategies and practices that students 
use during the construction of knowledge artifacts enables inferences about the epistemological criteria 
students try to meet. The strength of such analyses is that they enable comparison between students’ 
practices of scientific knowledge construction and normative objectives (e.g., Bell & Linn, 2000; Kelly 
& Takao, 2002; Sandoval, 2003). The limitation of such analyses is that by themselves they cannot 
illuminate students’ goals. 
 
Beliefs about personal knowledge creation 
Analyses of students’ practices of inquiry need to be supplemented by examinations of students’ beliefs 
about their own scientific work. Such investigations must be able to discriminate students’ views of 
such work as schoolwork from more clearly epistemological criteria. It is critical to determine whether 
or not students see inquiry in school as anything other than schoolwork. Such research can naturally 
supplement analyses of students’ practice, by asking students to explain what they were trying to 
accomplish through a particular investigation or in a particular artifact, and how they thought their 
strategies would do that. For example, high school students explaining problems of natural selection 
often fail to cite crucial data for claims of differential traits and selective advantage, despite having 
looked at relevant data and apparently drawing their conclusions from them (Sandoval, 2003). Why? Is 
it because they do not feel citing data is important? Do they believe that these data are understood by 
everyone in the class, and thus citation is superfluous? Are they unsure of the meaning of data and thus 
unsure of how to use it in their explanations? Sandoval’s study does not answer these questions, but 
such answers are needed to clarify how students’ epistemological ideas influence their inquiry. Such 
research does not appear to have been done, but it is the critical step in linking enacted practices to 
espoused beliefs, and changes in beliefs to changes in practice. 
 
Beliefs about disciplinary knowledge creation  
The need to ground research on scientific epistemologies more directly in students’ own work does not 
obviate ongoing efforts to assess students’ beliefs about the nature of professional science. On the 
 832
contrary, such assessments are an important way to determine whether or not efforts to develop 
students’ epistemological ideas have any effect. Efforts to develop open-ended assessments (e.g., 
Lederman et al., 2002) should continue. It is probably the case, however, that such instruments will 
remain inherently ambiguous because of the numerous ways that decontextualized philosophical 
questions might be interpreted. The very fact that so many great thinkers throughout history have 
attempted to characterize the nature of scientific knowledge and the methods for creating it should 
make researchers cautious about their interpretations of students’ responses to such profound questions. 
Most importantly, research on scientific epistemologies and their development will progress only as 
research in these three areas are combined. Work on what might be called students’ practical 
epistemologies, epistemology as manifested in action, must be linked to their expressed beliefs about 
professional science. One possible strategy for making this connection is to ask students to reflect on 
how the work they do in school relates to scientific work, rather than simply asking abstract, 
decontextualized questions about the nature of theories or experimentation. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Given the long history of science education reform efforts, it is troubling that so little progress has been 
made in developing students’ ideas about the epistemological nature of science. Inquiry-based 
instruction is now seen as the primary vehicle for the development of scientific epistemologies, but it 
does not seem to change students’ epistemological ideas. Instead, students’ ideas about science appear 
to drive their efforts at inquiry and frame their views of that work. This is the inquiry paradox. I have 
argued here that solving the inquiry paradox requires a more grounded and interconnected approach to 
understanding students’ epistemological beliefs and their influence on students’ efforts to build 
scientific knowledge. This grounded approach must combine assessments of students’ practices of 
knowledge construction with queries about their epistemological views of such work and its relation to 
professional scientific practice. Epistemic tools, software programs that structure students’ articulation 
of their own scientific knowledge, can support such research in two ways. First, they help to create a 
context in which students’ inquiry can be explicitly grounded in epistemological terms, through 
focusing on the nature of the artifact such inquiry should produce. Second, these artifacts can be 
analyzed in ways that illuminate students’ epistemological commitments. Both instructionally and 
analytically, structured artifacts can support exploration of students’ epistemological commitments and 
how they change through instruction. 
 
This approach will provide several benefits. First, it will provide a clearer picture of the epistemological 
beliefs that guide students’ personal knowledge construction, including their ideas about the kind of 
knowledge they can construct and how to do so. This will enable a much better assessment of the 
commonalities and differences between students’ epistemological beliefs and formal scientific 
epistemologies. This picture can add greatly to developmental research on personal epistemology by 
generating accounts of how epistemological ideas develop through experience, namely school science 
experiences. Second, one of the biggest questions about epistemological development is the extent to 
which epistemological conceptions are general or vary across domains (e.g., science, history, ethics). 
The grounded approach argued for here can be pursued across domains to address this question. Finally, 
a better picture of students’ epistemological beliefs about science and their influence on inquiry will 
enable better models for instruction that can fulfill the promise of science education reform for a 
citizenry that understands the role of science in their everyday lives. 
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